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ABSTRACT 
 
Degradation and fatigue of static equipment is common in the offshore industry. The combination of 
saltwater, temperature, and humidity can significantly reduce the integrity of static process 
equipment, and thereby increase the possibility of failure. Condition monitoring and inspection of 
oil and gas production facilities are regularly performed to maximize availability, but the vast 
amount of data and imperfect results may be difficult to interpret.  
 
Inspections on static process equipment are usually planned and executed based on risk-based 
principles, where risk is defined as a combination of consequence of failure (CoF) and probability of 
failure (PoF). This technique is called Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) planning. The inspection plans 
are based on the risk-evaluation and degradation rate calculated using base parameter values (e.g. 
flow rate, production, temperature, pressure). However, the values are static which gives a narrow 
view of the process since fluctuations of parameters are common at such production facilities. 
 
Condition monitoring (CM) is a technique where the process condition is monitored either 
continuously or periodically. This technique monitors process parameters (e.g. temperature, 
pressure, flow rate, etc.) and feeds the user/onshore engineer with data regarding the equipment. 
The data collected may then be used to ascertain the possible rate of degradation mechanisms, 
which in turn can be used to calculate PoF, CoF and eventually risk. 
 
A condition management system integrates the condition monitoring and risk-based inspection. The 
collection of live process parameters is integrated dynamically with the RBI analysis, optimizing the 
decision-making for inspection and maintenance planning of topside static mechanical equipment.  
 
This thesis presents a work process for how a condition management system could be designed. It 
will give guidance on how information and data should be assessed and integrated to give the 
user/onshore engineer useful and effective support.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Inspections and maintenance are today planned by using static data which is gathered on intervals 
with respect to the equipment’s risk category. This works to some degree, but it is not effective with 
respect to cost or manpower, and unforeseen fluctuations in the process data can occur. Process 
data on factors like flow, temperature and pressure has a big impact on the degradation 
mechanisms of materials. For the RBI analysis to be effective, it is important that parameters in the 
inspection plan are updated so the inspections are executed at the “right time”, since this would 
increase safety and decrease cost. 
 
As of today, limited work has been carried out to show how to integrate condition monitoring of 
process parameters and Risk-Based Inspection (RBI), even though the advantages are obvious. Thus 
it is important to develop a work process giving guidance on how this could be done, and also 
showing important factors as well as the pitfalls one should avoid. The work process developed in 
this thesis should be easily adapted to existing facilities to reduce the cost of implementation.  
 
This thesis presents the details of a proposed work process for integrating condition monitoring and 
RBI to develop an effective condition management system. 
 
1.2 Aim of the thesis 
The aim of the project is to develop a work process for condition management by integrating 
condition monitoring of process parameters and RBI. This thesis will also give experience in 
creating work processes as well as an introduction to RBI and condition monitoring. 
 
The proposed approach should allow for the proper use of available data, obtained through 
condition monitoring, by connecting it to the RBI analysis. The procedure should thus support 
optimized decision-making for the inspection and maintenance of topside static mechanical 
equipment. 
 
1.3 Scope 
The scope of this thesis is to develop a work process for how to implement an effective condition 
management system which should be easily adapted to existing facilities, avoiding the costs of 
modifications. 
 
  2 
1.4 Limitations 
The limitation for this thesis was to keep it on a general level and not to go too deeply into how 
everything works, but instead to give a clear picture of the work process itself. Other limitations 
were: 
 The thesis will be based on a detailed literature study combining the best of condition 
monitoring and RBI techniques.  
 The thesis will focus on topside static mechanical equipment. 
 The thesis will in general focus on how the continuous monitored data can be integrated 
with periodic data, and support inspection planning and execution. 
 
1.5 Thesis approach 
This thesis is based on a detailed literature study and an existing framework for condition 
management. The thesis is done qualitatively through using available information concerning 
condition monitoring and RBI combined with the student’s own knowledge. Standards and 
recommended practices are also used to make sure the procedure is up-to-date on laws and 
regulations.  
 
The second chapter will give general information about what condition management is based on. 
This will give the reader a fundament for understanding the main part of the thesis. 
 
The third chapter is the thesis itself, in which a work process for implementing condition 
monitoring is presented. This chapter is divided into sub-chapters, each of which represents one 
step in the condition management system. Each step is organized so the preceding step is directly 
connected to the one that follows. However, since it is a complex system, there are also connections 
back and forth between chapters to give the reader a full picture of the complete system. 
 
Chapter four discusses challenges in the thesis and how these were solved, while chapter five 
presents the conclusion of this thesis. 
1.6 Abbreviations 
CBM – Condition Based Maintenance 
CM – Condition Monitoring 
CoF – Consequence of Failure 
CUI – Corrosion under Insulation 
DCS – Distributed Control System  
DNV – Det Norske Veritas 
ESCC – External Stress Corrosion Cracking 
FMECA –Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
FORM – First Order Reliability Method 
GUI – Graphic User Interface 
HIC – Hydrogen Induced Cracking 
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ICT – Information and Communication Technology 
I/O – Input/Output 
MC – Monte Carlo 
MIC - Microbiologically Induced Corrosion 
NDT – Non Destructive Testing 
OE – Onshore Engineer 
OLE – Object Linking and Embedding 
OPC – OLE for Process Control  
PLC – Programmable Logic Controller 
PLL – Potential Loss of Life  
POB – Personnel on Board 
PoF – Probability of Failure 
P&ID – Piping and Instrument Diagram 
RBI – Risk-Based Inspection 
RDBMS – Relation Data Base Management System 
SSC – Sulphide Stress Cracking 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature overview 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Planning inspections and maintenance is a focus area for offshore industries because of costs and 
safety issues. Performing inspections at the “right time” would decrease cost and increase safety, 
through avoiding unnecessary inspections. This is a predictive approach, where the equipment’s 
condition shows when inspections and maintenance should be carried out. The whole idea is to find 
the optimal time-to-inspect with respect to cost and safety.  
 
In this chapter, the two methods that are going to be integrated will be presented: RBI and condition 
monitoring. These two methods will be presented respectively since they are a big part of this 
thesis. This general information is required to understand the work process for condition 
management (ref. Chapter 3). The two methods are presented based on a literature overview. 
 
2.2 Risk-based inspection analysis 
 
Risk-based inspection (RBI) is a risk-dependent planning method for inspections of static 
equipment. It is a risk-based approach, where the time-to-inspect will depend on the risk category 
for every single item of equipment – which is obtained by a combination of probability of failure 
(PoF) and consequence of failure (CoF) (DNV, 2009).  
 
The RBI analysis can be performed in three ways: qualitatively, quantitatively or semi-
quantitatively/qualitatively. The quantitative RBI analysis is built on calculations, and therefore it 
requires large amounts of correct input data. This makes the results from the analysis accurate, but 
it is hard to collect the required amount of data and assure that it is correct.  The qualitative method 
is built on subjective values, often made by experts, e.g. inspection, material, and structural 
engineers. The results will therefore depend on the knowledge and experience of these experts, 
which might be deficient. The most common way of using RBI combines these two. The available 
data (quantitative method) and expert knowledge (qualitative method) are integrated, thus giving a 
fundament for further decision-making. The deliverables of an RBI assessment are given in Figure 
2.1. 
 
  6 
 
Figure 2.1 Deliverables of a RBI assessment (Adapted from DNV presentation 1, 2010) 
 
The RBI assessment is a time-consuming method since production facilities often consist of a large 
number of items of equipment. Thus, a thorough work process has been developed for performing a 
RBI assessment (DNV, 2009). Figure 2.2 shows the inspection management loop in which RBI 
analysis is incorporated. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Inspection Management Loop (Adapted from DNV presentation 1, 2010) 
 
2.2.a Inspection Philosophy 
This step includes the acceptance criteria, which are often given by company policy and governing 
documents. The criteria show how much risk is accepted, and this often depends on the structure 
and the type of consequences that can occur. If, later in the work process, it is found that the risk is 
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higher than the acceptance criteria, actions to decrease the probability or consequence have to be 
performed. It is normal to have one acceptance criterion for each of the three consequences: 
economic, environmental and safety. 
 
2.2.b Risk-Based Inspection Planning 
The planning of the RBI is where all the deliverables in Figure 2.1 are planned. The first part of the 
planning phase is to get an overview of the production which is often done by looking at process 
piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID) along with other documents. The first step in finding the 
equipment to inspect is called screening. Screening is often performed in a qualitative way by a 
team; here the aim is to find static equipment which has an insignificant risk and can thus be 
removed from further analysis. Equipment that is “screened” out will not be in the inspection plan, 
and because of the low risk it will most likely be repaired/replaced when it fails (run-to-failure, ref. 
Chapter 2.2). The remaining equipment will then be assessed in more detail, finding PoF, CoF and 
risk.  
 
Probability of Failure (PoF) is a value that defines the probability that a component will fail within a 
defined time period, and since this thesis focuses on static equipment, a failure would mean a loss of 
containment of a pipe/valve that leads to unwanted release. PoF for such static equipment is set by 
calculating the degradation for the different corrosion groups and comparing this to the nominal 
wall thickness. This would then show the probability that it will fail within a certain time period. 
This assessment should also include any uncertainties included. PoF is then ranked as shown in 
Appendix A (DNV, 2009). PoF can be established qualitatively or calculated quantitatively, with the 
quantitative way being used as long as it is applicable. 
 
Consequence of failure is the effect of an incident, given that it has already occurred. The type of 
consequence is often divided into three parts (DNV, 2009): 
 
 Safety consequence – Consequences that affect human health (often expressed in potential 
loss of life (PLL) for personnel.). 
 Economic consequence – Consequences that will affect the financial state of the company 
(often expressed in financial terms). 
 Environmental consequence – Consequences that affect the environment, e.g. pollution, 
spills (often expressed in volume of pollutant). Reputation is also strongly affected by big 
environmental consequences. 
 
It is recommended that each of these parts has its own CoF evaluation since the consequences can 
differ, and each of them requires proper focus. The CoF is then ranked according to severity, as 
shown in Appendix A. CoF is found qualitatively since it deals with consequences regarding 
reputation and environment, thus not making it applicable for a quantitative calculation. Other 
factors that also affect consequence are personnel on board (POB) the installation, amount released 
if the static equipment fails, and chemicals included in released substance, etc. 
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The values obtained from the PoF and CoF analysis are then gathered in a risk matrix, thereby giving 
the equipment a risk category. Figure 2.3 shows a simple example of a risk matrix, and Appendix B 
shows the risk matrix in higher resolution and detail. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Example of risk matrix 
 
This risk must be below the acceptance criteria, which is here shown by the blue line. If the risk is 
higher, actions to lower either the consequence or the probability must be performed. From this 
risk-based analysis the assessment will, in the end, have a list of equipment, arranged after risk 
evaluation. The equipment’s risk evaluation will determine the next time-to-inspect. Equipment 
with high risk will be inspected more often then medium-ranked equipment, while low-ranked 
equipment will not be inspected at all. Equipment with low risk is screened out since it can break 
down without causing any significant consequence. 
 
The risk ranking will then give an answer as to what to inspect, but there are other deliverables that 
have to be considered as well. When the equipment to be inspected has been chosen, it is important 
to find out where to do the inspection. This is often based on specifications of that particular 
equipment, knowledge (experience/historical data) and guidance from the manufacturer.  When the 
hotspot (the optimal spot to inspect to get a satisfactory indication of the condition concerning 
degradation) is found, the inspection tool has to be selected. Non destructive testing (NDT) is the 
most common inspection method and, as the name implies, it is performed without damaging the 
equipment. Examples of NDT methods are radiography, thermography, and ultrasonic testing, as 
well as visual inspection (DNV, 2009; NDT, 2011). The type of inspection method used will depend 
on what information is needed to evaluate the condition of the equipment. When the information 
about what, where, and how to inspect are obtained, an inspection programme showing all these, 
including when to inspect, can be developed.  
  9 
 
2.2.c Inspection execution 
Based on the established inspection programmes, the inspections are carried out accordingly. 
Inspection data will then be stored in a database and equipment that is close to the acceptance 
criteria should be reported. Other data which was defined in the planning phase as important 
should be included. 
 
2.2.d Inspection data evaluation 
The data collected from the inspections are evaluated by a team of experts. Abnormal data or data 
that do not concur with expected data should be carefully evaluated, and inspections should be 
performed according to applicable standards. A report on integrity status, system effectiveness and 
a summary of issued recommendation for mitigating actions is issued annually. The inspection 
results are then put back into the assessment loop, and a complete reanalysis is then performed 
closing the inspection management loop illustrated in Figure 2.2. The knowledge gained through 
inspections will give a less conservative and more efficient inspection programme for the coming 
year as the knowledge of each system increases and the calculation can be performed with less 
uncertainty. 
 
To summarize, the RBI assessment uses PoF and CoF to develop an inspection programme that is 
updated annually with new inspection data, information and knowledge, thereby making the 
inspection programme more efficient over time. 
 
2.3 Condition monitoring of process parameters 
 
Maintenance has always been a big focus area for plants since the cost from unplanned downtime is 
very high, certainly when considering the offshore industry. There are many types of maintenance 
strategies which are chosen with respect to safety and cost, as Figure 2.4 shows (Kumar & Kumar, 
2004). 
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Figure 2.4 Maintenance techniques (Kumar & Kumar, 2004) 
 
Corrective maintenance is a strategy in which the equipment is not repaired before it fails (run-to-
failure). This can be done on equipment which has no safety hazard and will not cause downtime 
(risk ≤ low). Figure 2.4 also differentiates between planned and unplanned maintenance, where 
unplanned refers to failure with consequence (risk > low) which is what every installation wants to 
avoid. 
 
The other strategy is preventive maintenance where, as the term implies, repairs are performed to 
prevent the equipment from failing. There are two “types” of preventive maintenance: periodic 
maintenance and condition based maintenance (CBM). Periodic maintenance is performed at set 
intervals based on the calendar or operational time, while CBM is performed based on the 
equipment’s condition.  
 
CBM can be thought of as a predictive maintenance tool which uses condition monitoring to predict 
failure. Condition monitoring can be periodic or continuous monitoring of equipment, where 
important parameters showing the condition are monitored. This method is used a lot on dynamic 
equipment offshore (e.g. turbines, pumps, machines) through monitoring parameters like vibration, 
heat, loading, etc.  However, in this thesis we will monitor process parameters like temperature, 
pressure, flow rate, etc. since these are important when considering degradation of static 
equipment. The process parameters will be monitored continuously and the data collected are used 
to evaluate the equipment condition considering degradation. Having access to condition data 
makes it possible to perform servicing, or other actions, before the failure occurs. Figure 2.5 shows 
that failures are often not detectable at early stages which make it important to observe them as 
soon as possible to prevent failure. The Y-axis, called condition, can be divided into two different 
types of conditions: performance and integrity. Performance can be monitored through looking at 
parameters that shows the efficiency of the equipment (e.g. turbine). Integrity, on the other hand, is 
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monitored through performing inspections, since most of the equipment is static (e.g. pipes, valves, 
vessels, etc.).  
 
Figure 2.5 Example showing equipment condition over time 
 
CM is a method which has emerged from periodic maintenance, and this has made the monitoring 
process very static in nature. But the introduction of information and communication technology 
(ICT) revolutionized the monitoring process since it could be done continuously. ICT made it 
possible to get live data and information shown directly on the operator’s screen. Maintenance and 
service plans can now be easily developed, and, with the use of correct parameters, the fault itself 
can be located by just analyzing the data. 
 
CM can be used as a direct or indirect tool to help the onshore engineer (OE). Information that is 
assessed directly, like vibration, is made up of parameters which can cause great damage by 
themselves. Information assessed indirectly consists of measurements that have to be combined 
with other information to give any valuable results regarding the equipment’s condition. An 
example is the use of pressure, volume and temperature to measure the efficiency of a turbine. 
 
Implementing CM can be expensive if the existing facility does not have the required sensors and 
sampling stations to get the information needed. Many models for implementing CM have been 
developed, and some simplified steps are given as an example: 
1. Survey of the plant 
2. Choose parameters 
3. Monitor 
4. Evaluate 
5. Perform actions 
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Firstly, a survey is performed where engineers overview the production process and find critical 
equipment with respect to production and safety. The equipment that could affect the safety risk is 
the first priority, but cost is also a factor to be included (downtime). Equipment will then be 
evaluated qualitatively by a group that looks into how failures could occur on each machine. The 
most common method used is the failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) which 
shows what can happen and the cause. The FMECA analysis would then give an indication of which 
parameters should be monitored to prevent failures. After the parameters have been selected, the 
CM technique has to be selected. For example, if temperature is a crucial parameter (e.g. electro 
motor), a sensor that can measure this has to be selected. When the sensors are in place, the limits 
should be set for each parameter. Fluctuations of the parameter data should be tracked, and trends 
should be included to aid the operator. Information like this would make it easier for the operator 
and maintenance engineers to evaluate the condition and perform actions accordingly.  
 
It is important to look at the CM method as an endless “loop” where information sharing and 
evaluation of each step is important. The most effective CM system can take years to fully develop, 
thus a continuous evaluation of each step is essential for improvement (DNV, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 3 
Development of a work process for condition management 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on how to integrate condition monitoring of process parameters with RBI. 
RBI analysis is used to manage inspections of static equipment topside, amongst other equipment, 
with respect to risk. The conventional method of performing RBI analysis is static in nature since 
degradation and cracking mechanisms are calculated with annual process parameters, even though 
these parameters could change over time. Through integrating condition monitoring and RBI, the 
changes in the parameters would be dynamically included in the analysis. Live process data (e.g. 
flow rate, temperature, pressure) is collected and processed, updating the original degradation 
condition. These changes might alter the PoF, and ultimately the risk set in the original RBI analysis. 
Since RBI is a risk-based inspection method, the change in risk will update the original inspection 
plan, thus assuring that inspections are executed at the right time.  
 
The integration of condition monitoring and RBI is called condition management. This is a 
management system that uses live process data to continuously assess the degradation condition of 
static equipment, which is then used to manage the inspection planning and execution. 
 
 Some of the benefits from such a management system are (Chai et al., 2010): 
 Performing the inspection at the “right time” would reduce costs related to unnecessary 
inspections of static equipment, as well as avoiding downtime related to inspections 
executed too late.  
 The continuous updating of degradation rates will avoid downtime related to degradation or 
cracking. 
 Personnel would understand the impact different parameters have on static equipment’s 
reliability and condition with respect to degradation. 
 The information and data delivered would aid the OE in making the correct decision 
regarding the planning and execution of inspection. 
 
There are many challenges with condition management: what parameters to use, how to collect 
data, how to process data, how to integrate live data and inspection data, how to use results in 
decision-making, etc. These challenges will be addressed in this study through a work process for 
implementing the condition management system. The work process in this thesis will use an 
existing framework as a foundation for the condition management model (Chai et al., 2010). The 
thesis is based on eight steps that are modified from the existing framework: 
1. Select sensors and sampling stations – Select sensors and sampling stations that can be used 
for assessing equipment degradation. 
2. Create an interface between sensor and operator – The second steps focuses on how to 
connect instruments (sensors/sampling stations) to the operator’s database. 
3. Data collection – The data collection stage shows how, and where, to collect and store data, 
as well as compression of data. 
  14 
4. Data processing – This focuses on how the collected data should be processed and present 
meaningful information to the OE. 
5. Risk estimation – The risk is updated based on the recalculated PoF given by the processed 
data. 
6. Setting limits and distributing alarms – This stage focuses on how to set limits for alarms, 
further analysis, etc. 
7. Inspection planning and execution – This shows how inspection should be planned, based on 
the updated risk, and executed.  
8. Decision support – The final step focuses on how data, information and knowledge gathered 
from the previous steps should be used to optimize decision-making concerning inspection 
planning and execution, as well as the system itself. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Condition management loop (Adapted from Chai et al., 2010) 
 
This thesis will use these steps to give guidance on how such a management system should be 
implemented. Figure 3.2 presents the condition management system based on this thesis, and it 
shows how the system interconnects. Using this figure when reading through the thesis is 
encouraged since this will make it easier to understand how the complete system works. This figure 
will also be further discussed in Chapter 3.10. 
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Figure 3.2 The condition management system 
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3.2 Select sensors and sampling stations 
 
The selection of sensors and sampling stations is performed to provide an overview of the available 
instruments installed on the existing plant. The reasons for performing such an overview are to: 
 Divide the system into corrosion groups. 
 Decide on the degradation mechanisms in each corrosion group. 
 Select the sensor and sampling station that can be used to monitor parameters that affect 
degradation. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Selecting sensors and sampling stations 
 
This step is performed using piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID) of the installation. These 
diagrams show how the system is designed and what type of material is used. By using such a 
diagram, the whole system can be divided into corrosion groups, as shown in Figure 3.5. A corrosion 
group is a section of static equipment which is considered to have the same operational conditions 
and material specifications, thus the same degradation mechanisms. Some materials are more 
susceptible to certain degradation mechanisms than others, and this should also be considered (see 
Chapter 3.5). In addition, some corrosion groups are non-susceptible to degradation (low PoF) or 
have no consequence if they fail (low CoF), and these groups can then be screened out without being 
further assessed. 
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When the corrosion groups are determined, the next step will be to decide which degradation 
mechanisms can occur in each corrosion group. Every degradation mechanism requires certain 
conditions, and the material specification in combination with operational condition will give the 
possible mechanisms which can occur. For more information concerning degradation mechanisms, 
see the recommended practice for RBI (DNV, 2009). Figure 3.4 shows what operational conditions 
have to be present for certain degradation mechanisms. 
 
Figure 3.4 Degradation mechanisms and corresponding parameters (Chai et al., 2010) 
 
Figure 3.4 shows that temperature, pressure, flow rate and production flow (amount and ratio of 
different substances in flow e.g. oil, gas, chemicals, salt, sand) are “on-line measurement” 
parameters which means that they can be monitored automatically using sensors. These parameters 
will be continuously monitored while “sampled measurements” are performed at certain intervals 
using sampling stations. The “design information” is fixed parameters like material and layout, but it 
can also be wall thickness which will change over time if corrosion occurs. All three types of 
information, as well as inspections, have to be included to have an accurate management system. 
 
When the degradation mechanisms and the parameters which have to be monitored are selected, 
the next step will be to determine which sensors and sampling stations to use. The main idea of 
condition management is to use existing sensors and sampling stations so the system can be 
implemented without performing modifications to the installation. This will reduce the cost of 
introducing such a system by avoiding downtime of production as well as the modification cost 
itself. However, if the existing sensors and sampling stations cannot deliver the data required, 
modifications should be performed. 
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Offshore installations are often highly equipped with sensors and sampling stations, but these 
instruments are placed with respect to the production process and not the degradation process. 
Locations that could give valuable information concerning degradation would then not always be 
present, which means that the data have to be considered with respect to the location of the 
instrument. Thus, it should be a priority to select the “worst case” spots (e.g. dead legs, low points, 
etc.) since the corrosion, in theory, should be worst at these spots (Chai et al., 2010). If such spots 
are not available, data from other locations have to be calibrated to give the most accurate data 
available. 
 
The selection of sensors and sampling stations is done by using the P&ID; see Figure 3.5. This figure 
already shows the corrosion groups in green, yellow and blue which respectively correspond to gas, 
oil and water. Then the information considering the parameters for assessing degradation condition 
is used to select the correct sensor or sampling station. The sensors also have to be transmitters, 
which means that they need to send signals continuously. Since temperature, pressure and flow rate 
are important for assessing degradation condition, these are shown in the P&ID. This P&ID can also 
be found with higher resolution and detail in Appendix C. 
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Figure 3.5 Example of P&ID (Adapted from document acquired from private 
communication, DNV) 
 
Locating sensors and sampling stations is easy when using a P&ID, but it is important to ensure that 
the sensor can collect and transfer the required data. Sensors are most often analogue where 
physical properties (e.g. temperature, pressure) are converted into a corresponding electrical signal 
(e.g. voltage, ampere or resistance) (Sensors, 2011). It is important to ensure that the sensors and 
sampling stations serve their purpose, and some general requirements are listed below (Markeset, 
2011): 
 
 Robust – They should be able to withstand the local environment they are operating in 
offshore (e.g. temperature, vibration, water, wind). 
Temperature & flow 
transmitters 
Pressure transmitter 
Temperature & flow 
transmitters 
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 All sensors must be analogue – Digital sensors have just 1 or 0 as output, while analogue 
sensors can have a wide spectrum of outputs. Thus the analogue sensors can be used to 
measure the changes in temperature, flow, pressure, etc. 
 Easy to calibrate (remote calibration is a plus). 
 Ex approved – Approved for explosion-protected electric apparatus (e.g. no sparks that can 
ignite flammable media). 
 High accuracy – Very accurate at important temperature and pressure levels with respect to 
corrosion (e.g. ± 0.5 °C between -20 - 120 °C and ± 1 bar between 0 - 200 bar). 
 Easy to connect – Safer with cable, easier with wireless. 
 Should have a high sample range to ensure correct measurement at abnormal conditions 
(e.g. temperature between -100 to 250 °C, pressure between 0 - 400 bar). 
 
3.3 Create an interface between sensor and operator 
 
The interface step includes two main tasks: 
 Identify each sensor and sampling station with a unique identification (ID) tag. 
 Create an interface between the sensor (hardware) and offshore operator (software). 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Create an interface between sensor and operator 
 
The sensors and sampling stations should be identified with a unique ID tag. Each sensor and 
sampling station would then have a unique tag which will make the process of collecting the correct 
data simpler and more efficient. Accessing the database server and selecting data with respect to ID 
tags will be further explained in the next chapter, while this chapter focuses on how data is 
transferred from the sensor to the operator offshore. 
 
An interface could be thought of as the point where inputs and outputs communicate, and in this 
case it makes un-useful information into useful information. The sensor measures a physical 
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property and converts this into an electric signal, which is why the interface needs to convert this 
into “useful” information. The interface is most often an I/O (input/output) controller which is 
programmed to convert the input to the required output. Some examples of controllers are 
programmable logic controller (PLC) and distributed control system (DCS). These are further 
connected to a server which receives all information from the process; see Figure 3.7. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Interface between sensor and offshore client 
 
There is a high variety of automation companies that deliver controllers and sensors (e.g. ABB, 
Siemens, Honeywell, etc.). In the past, each manufacturer had individual server and client software 
which had to be used to provide an interface between the controller and the offshore operator. They 
also had a unique programming language, and setup, which meant that you had to buy a complete 
system from one provider to make it work, and this system could not be integrated with other 
systems. This is the same problem that people previously had with printers, where each printer 
manufacturer had its own standard, and each printer needed a unique driver to work. Plants with 
sensors and controllers of different brands had a hard time integrating all this into one system; thus, 
something had to change. 
 
Not long ago the manufacturers got together with Microsoft to make one standard. This meant that 
each manufacturer followed one standard called the Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) for 
Process Control (OPC) standard. When all the manufacturers followed the OPC standard, the 
different controllers could easily be embedded in the control system from Microsoft. This is the 
same solution that the printer manufacturers had when they got together and made one standard, 
which meant that Microsoft could just embedded this standard in their operating system to install 
all types of printers automatically. Figure 3.8 shows the difference between the “conventional” and 
“modern” interface: 
 
  22 
 
Figure 3.8 “Conventional” and “Modern” interface 
 
We can think of the OPC as a “plug and play” server which can easily be connected to the controllers 
(PLC) on the plant. The number of servers and clients needed is about the same, but the 
implementation and installation of the control system is much faster and simpler. OPC will also 
make it much easier if new sensors have to be installed, since they can just be plugged in and 
identified with an ID tag.  
 
Process hardware manufacturers develop an OPC compliant interface which makes it possible to 
choose the best product without thinking about the integration part. The OPC server has to be 
connected to an OPC client since it is based on the same standards, and this client is used by the 
operator offshore to monitor the process (The OPC Foundation, 2011; Hauge et al., 2009). 
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3.4 Data collection 
 
Data collection focuses on how data should be collected and stored. There are many data sources, 
like sensors, sampling stations, inspection results, laboratory analysis, etc. The data from 
inspections, laboratory analysis and sampling stations are manually collected, and stored with the 
correct ID tag with respect to the corrosion group. The results from sampling stations and 
laboratory analysis should be stored on the main database server with the appropriate ID tag, 
making it possible for the onshore engineer (OE) to download the newest result and integrate it 
with live data in the data processing. Inspection results are given to the client, and stored in the 
local database. However, this chapter will focus on the continuous collection of process data from 
sensors, and how this should be done efficiently. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Data collection 
 
As shown in the interface stage, the data is first collected by the offshore operator who just stores 
temporary data before it is forwarded to the server’s database. This is done since it would not be 
economic to build server stations offshore on a platform, when it can be done onshore. Data is 
transferred through fibre cables or satellite, which are the most common link between offshore 
platforms and onshore offices (EDB, 2011). All data is stored on the main servers as often as the 
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sensor collects data, which can vary from seconds to hours. The data is then sorted according to the 
ID tag given by the interface. But the number of ID tags on a platform can vary from 30,000 to 
50,000 tags, and storing such an amount of data every second will decrease performance and 
increase cost of storage space. There are many commonly used database systems, e.g. Microsoft 
Access (Microsoft), MySQL (MySQL), PI (OSIsoft) (Microsoft, 2011; MySQL, 2011; OSIsoft, 2011). 
These systems use two common databases called relation data base management system (RDBMS) 
or time-series database. 
 
The RDBMS stores data in separate tables, but it also stores the relation between the data in another 
table. This makes it possible to create large databases in which the relation between data is 
sustained. The time-series database stores all data with respect to time, which means that all the 
different tags on the platform would get an individual table. How the data is stored is not the issue 
here; instead, we will focus on how the data is compressed before it is stored. 
 
The RDBMS compresses data using average values over a certain time period. The length of this 
time period will depend on how old the data is; so, if you have one-week-old data this might be 
compressed into hours or more (Ault, 2003). An example of how this is done is shown in Figure 
3.10: 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Compression of data in Relational Data Base Management System (RDBMS) 
 
This way of compressing data works fine; however, it can average out parameter variations that are 
important for accurate degradation calculations. Example: The “9” and “1” in the top row are 
averaged to a “4” which could be misleading when used later in the analysis. Degradation occurs 
slowly, and averaging can be done since changes over a short time period do not initiate 
degradation. However, there are much better and more accurate ways of compressing and 
averaging the data.  
 
The time-series databases are compressed in ways that give more valuable information to the OE. 
The compression in the time-series database is done by using an interval for how much a parameter 
can change before it is stored, thereby making the system as accurate as the OE requires. Since 
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degradation requires a substantial change in temperature, changes within an interval of ± 5% could 
still be accurate enough to assure degradation condition (DNV, 2009).  
 
Figure 3.11 Example of compression of time-series databases (Adapted from OSIsoft, 2009) 
 
This type of compression is done by looking at the trending of the signal, and rejecting values that 
do not change enough to breach the accuracy interval. If a value comes outside the interval slope, a 
new interval would be made following the “new” slope of the signal. From the example above, only 
the black dots will be saved, and the green dots will be deleted, where the end result is a line 
between the black dots, as shown by the red line. This will, in the end, give results with high 
resolution but also the fluctuation of the parameter over time. If data is downloaded at a time 
between two black dots, the server will show the value given by the red line. 
 
This will compress data without removing high fluctuations as in the RDBMS compression. Instead, 
it will compress the data and give results with high resolution. Such compression will also 
automatically remove noise which is common in signals from sensors.  
 
The database systems shown above also include automatic quality checks with respect to missing or 
conflicting data. This is mostly done by using the last known data, and connecting it to the next data 
collected. In addition, many interfaces are known to include a simple check of data which removes 
similar problems. However, if none of these quality checks work, the OE will perform a qualitative 
check before updating the inspection plan, thus avoiding faulty data interfering with the inspection 
plan (ref. Chapter 3.8). 
  
All the data from sensors and sampling stations are stored on the main server database, while 
inspection results are uploaded by the OE. However, since all the data from the installation is not 
needed, the data needed for calculating degradation are filtered out using ID tags. The OE would 
then only download data from sensors and sampling stations that were selected in the first step by 
using the ID tag they were given in the second step. In addition, the OE can perform a simple search 
to download data from any tag stored on the main database server (see Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.12).  
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Figure 3.12 Collecting data based on ID tags 
 
The OE should set up an individual dedicated local server, which downloads the required data. The 
local server will download data from the main server using ID tags, and then store and process it.  
 
3.5 Data processing 
 
In the data processing stage, the data collected from inspections, process parameters and sampling 
stations are calculated and transformed to give the OE information about degradation rates and the 
integrity of the plant. The subjects that will be covered are: 
 Selecting degradation model 
 Averaging data based on degradation model 
 Processing data  
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Figure 3.13 Data processing 
 
3.5.a Selecting degradation model 
The first step of the condition management system (ref. Chapter 3.2) divided the process plant into 
corrosion groups based on material specification and process flow. Using this overview, the OE can 
select which model to use based on material (e.g. carbon steel, stainless steel, titanium, etc.) and 
operational conditions (e.g. temperature, pressure, chemicals, oil-gas ratio, volume of water, 
humidity, etc.). There are three models that should be considered with respect to damage rates: 
insignificant model, rate model and susceptibility model (DNV, 2009). 
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Figure 3.14 PoF over time for the different degradation models (DNV, 2009) 
 
The insignificant model is used on equipment where no significant degradation is expected. The 
model allocates a fixed PoF of 10¯⁵ per year, which means that no planned inspection is necessary. 
This model is used on very tough materials like titanium, and these types of material are screened 
out early in the process (ref. Chapter 3.2).  
 
The rate model is used on equipment where degradation accumulates over time. This model is 
mostly used on carbon steel since its degradation mechanisms accumulate gradually (see Figure 
3.15). The degradation mechanisms in the rate model are often affected by various parameters, and 
a sensitivity analysis should be carried out to get the most accurate results. Using such analysis will 
give a degradation rate for each degradation mechanism, instead of looking at each parameter with 
respect to rate. Typical degradation mechanisms are: 
 CO₂ corrosion  
 Corrosion in utility water systems 
 Sand erosion 
 External corrosion of insulated carbon steel piping 
 Erosion (e.g. sand, particulate matter) 
 Microbiologically Induced Corrosion (MIC)  
 Corrosion under Insulation (CUI)  
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Figure 3.15 Typical rate model graphs (DNV, 2009) 
 
The susceptibility model is the most interesting model when considering the use of live process 
data. This model is made for damage which occurs very quickly and locally (e.g. cracking and 
pitting), thus the inspections will not be feasible (DNV, 2009). This model uses a fixed PoF for each 
parameter since degradation initiates too quickly to consider damage rates (Figure 3.16). The 
susceptible model focuses on the temperature parameter since this is the main trigger for most 
degradation mechanisms, and tends to outweigh other parameters (e.g. pressure, flow rate, etc.). 
 
The model covers one degradation mechanism in carbon steel and copper-nickel alloys, but it is 
mostly used on high alloy steel (e.g. stainless steel). Some degradation mechanisms in the 
susceptibility model are: 
 Corrosion in utility water systems 
 Local corrosion  
 External Stress Corrosion Cracking (ESCC) 
 Internal corrosion by water - CuNi 
 
The susceptibility model includes all types of high alloy steel, and three common types are: SS316, 
Duplex, and 6Mo. These materials are very sensitive to changes in temperature; an increase of 10 °C 
in temperature on a 6Mo stainless steel pipe would make the PoF rise from 10⁻⁴ to 0.1, as shown 
below (DNV, 2009). 
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Figure 3.16 – Susceptibility model showing PoF for local CUI (DNV, 2009) 
 
3.5.b Averaging data based on degradation model 
Averaging data is done for continuously monitored data; since sampled data are collected at long 
intervals, they would not need averaging. Since degradation mechanisms are not initiated at the 
moment a parameter change, values should be averaged to give more meaningful information to the 
OE. Spikes in the parameters over 10 minutes will not initiate degradation, while a high parameter 
averaged over a week might be a different case. This will depend on what model the respective 
degradation mechanism uses, and the parameters that influence degradation.  
 
 
Figure 3.17 Averaging data 
  
When we consider the rate model, the degradation accumulates; thus, the parameters for these 
degradation mechanisms should be averaged over a time period with respect to how quickly they 
initiate. Since the rate model most often considers degradation rates around millimetres per year, 
the averaging time period could be set to days. Degradation mechanisms in the susceptibility model 
initiate faster and should therefore have a shorter averaging time period (e.g. an hour).  However, 
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the time periods to be averaged could also be based on each degradation mechanism, instead of the 
degradation model, making the system even more accurate.  
 
Setting such averaging time periods is hard since there is no set time to how fast degradation 
initiates. Thus, these time periods should be set qualitatively by experienced degradation experts, 
and updated when new information is available through this system. Information gathered over 
time provides the ability to differentiate between the mechanisms in the same degradation model, 
making the system more effective and accurate. In the beginning, it is better to make conservative 
averaging time periods since it is better to be safe than sorry. 
 
3.5.c Calculating and processing data 
Downloaded data are originally used by looking at trends showing the fluctuations over a certain 
time period. This makes it possible for the OE to select trends that will give the most valuable 
information. However, to give even more valuable information, the data should also be processed. 
The local server downloads data, averages it with respect to degradation model (or degradation 
mechanism), and processes the data to evaluate the condition with respect to degradation. 
Inspection results are manually uploaded by the OE where applicable, and they are used to check 
that the calculations are correct (ref. Chapter 3.9) and to update wall thickness. 
 
Assessing degradation condition for susceptibility is a simpler task since it mainly depends on 
temperature. This would then be a conversion from temperature to PoF (Figure 3.19). The rate 
model is more complex since it often depends on several parameters (Figure 3.18). If there are two 
or more parameters which affect the degradation mechanisms, a sensitivity analysis should be 
performed to give a more accurate degradation rate. The results from such sensitivity analysis will 
show the correlation of each parameter with respect to degradation rate (Figure 3.18). Some of the 
calculations are often comprehensive, and software like Microsoft Excel is often used to perform 
these since it supports large calculations (Microsoft, 2011). However, some parameters also affect 
the degradation mechanism more than others, and parameters like temperature and pressure often 
outweigh others, thus simplifying the calculations. 
 
The processed data should then be presented and compared to acceptance limits, thus showing the 
condition with respect to degradation. Methods on how to set limits are further discussed in the 
chapter concerning alarm distribution (ref. Chapter 3.7). 
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Figure 3.18 Example of acceptance limits for the rate model (Adapted from DNV presentation 
2, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 3.19 Example of acceptance limits for the susceptibility model 
 
Figures 3.18 and 3.19 shows the condition of the equipment with respect to degradation. The colour 
code shows the condition using the traffic light principle: green – satisfactory, yellow – moderate, 
and red – critical. These conditions will be based on degradation rate or PoF, depending on the 
model (rate or susceptibility).  
 
The results from such calculated degradation conditions could then be shown using a Graphic User 
Interface (GUI). This can be thought of as how the information should be represented to the onshore 
engineer (OE). Higgs and Parkin (2006) wrote a paper on important things to remember when 
designing a GUI: 
 Keep information simple – Simple overview of the system 
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 Structure information with respect to criticality – Critical, Moderate, Satisfactory 
 Use appropriate colours – Red, Yellow, Green 
 Target the intended audience – The OE of the system 
 Use graphic images that are recognizable – P&ID 
 Flexible – The OE can perform changes easily (e.g. change limits, include new degradation 
mechanisms, change process conditions, etc.) 
 
By following the steps given by Higgs and Parkin (2006), a simple example of an overview of the 
system, showing degradation condition, can be made: 
 
 
Figure 3.20 Example of an overview of the system (Adapted from DNV presentation 2, 2008) 
 
This overview uses a traffic light on each corrosion group to show the OE the condition with respect 
to corrosion. The OE can then look further into corrosion groups which do not have a satisfactory 
degradation condition, finding the root cause of the problem, thus giving support for further 
decisions (ref. Chapter 3.9). This system should be flexible in the way that the OE can change limits 
and process condition, but also go further into each corrosion group and look at trends for each 
parameter. This enables the OE to discover the abnormality that causes degradation, and further 
provide this information to the offshore operators who can perform measures to decrease 
degradation. Such visualization is supported by software like ORBIT IDS (DNV), PI (OSIsoft), 
Maximo (IBM), SAP (Orbit, 2011; OSIsoft, 2011; Maximo Asset Management, 2011; SAP, 2011). The 
box in the overview window called “Changes in Original Risk” shows the number of changes to the 
original risk. This is found through the risk estimation (ref. Chapter 3.6) which is calculated if the 
change in degradation condition is at such a degree that it should be further processed (ref. Chapter 
3.5d). 
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Data will be processed continuously, to give the OE a real-time view of the condition. Processing will 
be carried out at the local server, which collects and processes data. The OE can then, at any time, 
connect to the dedicated server and monitor the live degradation condition of the system. This will 
ensure that conditions can be monitored at the OE’s wishes, but also enables the triggering of 
inspection alarms if necessary (ref. Chapter 3.7). The alarm is triggered if the results from the risk 
estimation (ref. Chapter 3.6) are above the acceptance criteria. So if the data is not processed, this 
alarm will not be triggered; thus, it should run continuously. 
 
However, it is important that the interval that the OE monitors the condition is not longer than the 
averaging time period for the parameters (ref. Chapter 3.5b). This could cause the OE to overlook 
equipment that has had a high degradation rate. So, either the system should be monitored at a time 
period less or equal to the lowest averaging time period, or, the system could always show the worst 
degradation condition between each time the OE accesses the monitoring system.  
 
 
3.5.d Further processing 
Degradation conditions which will change the original risk should be further processed, and this can 
be done qualitatively by the OE. However, to make the system more efficient, a filter should be made 
where data is automatically sent for new risk estimation. Thus, moderate to critical degradation 
conditions should be sent for a risk estimation to ensure that the risk is not above the acceptance 
criteria. 
 
The system should also be set up so the OE can send data for further processing whenever needed. 
Since a RBI re-analysis is done at certain intervals (e.g. every year), there must be an option where 
all data can be sent for a new risk estimation. Such re-analysis is done to keep the complete system 
up-to-date, even for the corrosion groups with a satisfactory degradation condition. This would 
ensure that all corrosion groups are updated with a new risk estimate, even though the changes are 
minimal. 
 
More information on how to set limits is given in the chapter concerning alarm distribution and 
setting limits (ref. Chapter 3.7). 
 
3.6 Risk estimation 
 
This section shows how the risk estimation is performed when the data is approved for further 
processing; this is a major part of RBI analysis. Such risk estimation is done either:  
 At certain intervals (e.g. every quarter, half or one year), or 
 If there are changes that will update the original risk. 
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Figure 3.21 Risk estimation 
 
DNV uses in-house developed software called ORBIT which can automatically perform risk 
calculations based on data. ORBIT could, therefore, be integrated with the software used to collect 
and process data, so values can be transferred and included in the analysis. If different software 
cannot be directly connected, interface software (e.g. Microsoft Excel) can work as a connection link 
between them (Microsoft, 2011). The only requirement would be that both programs support the 
same “interface” software. 
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Figure 3.22 System for efficient risk estimation 
 
However, in this chapter it will be explained how PoF is calculated for both degradation models, and 
how it ultimately affects the risk category. This section is based on DNV’s recommended practice for 
RBI of static mechanical equipment (DNV, 2009). 
 
3.6.a Calculating PoF  
This chapter shows how PoF is calculated with respect to the degradation model. The PoF will 
change if the original parameter value has changed, and this would then ultimately affect the risk 
category of the equipment at hand. 
 
Calculating PoF for the susceptibility model 
The susceptibility model gives a fixed value of PoF depending on factors relating to operating 
conditions (Figure 3.16). Temperature is the parameter that this model focuses on since this 
outweighs other parameters (e.g. salt, oxygen content, pressure, flow rate, etc.). This model is thus 
very easy to use since just a simple conversion will give the PoF with respect to temperature. This is 
also already given in the data processing part, so the PoF is actually already calculated. 
 
Calculating PoF for the rate model 
Given the degradation rate for each degradation mechanism, all rates are calculated, but only the 
highest rate will be used to calculate PoF. This can be done since the degradation mechanisms with 
the highest rate, in the same corrosion group, outweigh the others. However, it is important to 
differentiate between internal and external, since internal degradation will not affect external 
degradation, and vice versa. Thus, the highest degradation rate both from external and internal 
degradation will be used to calculate the PoF on that particular corrosion group. 
 
Calculating PoF based on rates is a comprehensive task, and probabilistic models like Monte Carlo 
(MC) simulation and First Order Reliability Method (FORM) are often used since the calculations 
include uncertainty (standard deviation) which are inherited from the factors that are included in 
the degradation mechanism (see Table 3.1). These can be included using these models through 
running simulations enough times (e.g. 10,000 times). For more information on calculating PoF, see 
DNV’s recommended practice (DNV, 2009). 
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Corrosion rates in carbon steel piping by different categories of water 
Material Type Mean            (mm/year) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(mm/year) 
Raw Seawater Flow dependent: Rates 
from Figure 3.14. 
0.1 
Seawater + 
Biocide/Chlorination 
Flow dependent: Rates 
from Figure 3.14. 
0.1 
Seawater Low Oxygen 0.01 0.01 
Seawater Low Oxygen + 
Biocide 
0.01 0.01 
Seawater Low Oxygen + 
Chlorination 
0.01 0.01 
Seawater Low Oxygen + 
Biocide + Chlorination 0.01 0.01 
 Fresh Water (Cl less than 
200 ppm) 
0.25 0.1 
Closed Loop 0.01 0.01 
Exposed Drains Flow dependent: Rates 
from Figure 3.14. 
0.1 
Sanitary Drains Treat as MIC. Rates from 
Figure 3.14. 
0.1 
Table 3.1 Degradation mechanism in the rate model where mean rate and standard deviation 
are included (DNV, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 3.23 Calculating PoF for the rate model 
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3.6.b Estimating risk 
CoF is mostly static and will not change, and will therefore be a fixed value. This CoF value will be 
qualitatively changed when there is a full RBI re-analysis of the complete installation. Changes that 
might alter the original CoF are: 
 Changes in design (e.g. firewall installed, change in piping, new vessels, etc.) 
 Chemicals included which can hurt personnel (e.g. acids) 
 Introduction of new degradation mechanism which might cause amount of release to be 
greater 
 Etc.  
 
Calculation of CoF is found qualitatively where possible outcomes of incidents are discussed using 
fault trees and FMECA. For further information on calculating CoF, see DNV recommended practice 
(2009) (ref. Chapter 2.2). 
 
When a new PoF and CoF are calculated, the risk matrix is used to find the new risk category (Figure 
2.3).  However, since the CoF does not change, it is possible to only look at the PoF, thus simplifying 
the process of finding the change in total risk. As the example in Figure 3.24 shows, PoF is the only 
factor which changes, thus removing the need for a full risk matrix to find actual risk. 
 
 
 
  Figure 3.24 Risk-based only on PoF 
 
There are three outcomes from updating PoF: 
 Lower than original PoF 
 Higher than original PoF 
 Over acceptance limit – the analysis showed that the risk is over the acceptance criteria 
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The first two outcomes (lower and higher than original) will be shown to the OE the next time the 
system is monitored. This can be done by adding a box in the overview window which has to be 
acknowledged; an example is given in Figure 3.20 where the box called “Changes in Original Risk” is 
included. This window will show what changes, and how many, there are to the original risk. The OE 
can then look at each of these changes and find the root cause of the problem, and thereafter decide 
if the inspection plan should be updated (ref. Chapter 3.8). The reason why this is important will be 
discussed in the chapter concerning inspection planning. 
 
If the PoF is over the acceptance limit, an inspection alarm should be triggered, and notification 
should be sent to the OE by e-mail, SMS, pop-up on screen, etc. This alarm notifies that an inspection 
should be executed to ensure safe operation and give accurate data so the OE can decide on further 
action (ref. Chapter 3.9). Setting such limits and distributing alarms are further discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
3.7 Alarm distribution and setting limits 
 
This chapter will focus on how the inspection alarm is distributed and methods on how to set 
degradation limits, as well as alarm limits. There are different ways of setting limits, and it will 
depend on how the data is interpreted. Thus, some typical ways of interpreting data are considered, 
and how limits should be set with respect to these are explained. Figure 3.25 shows how alarms and 
updates should be sent depending on the criticality of the situation, thus the name alarm 
distribution. 
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Figure 3.25 Alarm distribution 
 
3.7.a Methods for setting limits 
It can be hard to set accurate limits to give the OE the correct view of the system at hand. The limits 
can be viewed as threshold values, where the data indicates a potential unhealthy degradation 
condition. How the limits are set will depend on what they are based on, and how much knowledge 
there is about the data coming in. This part will focus on four methods of setting limits (Bey-
Temsamani et al., 2011; Garvey, 2002):  
 Expert judgment 
 Statistics 
 Trends 
 Models 
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Figure 3.26 Setting limits 
 
Expert judgment is by far the most common method of setting limits, and the method is often based 
on the experts’ own knowledge and experience. The method is mostly used when there is a lack of 
information (e.g. historical data, models, etc.). A group of people with expertise in their respective 
field (e.g. corrosion, material, etc.) comes together to determine a limit based on their own 
knowledge and experience. 
 
Figure 3.27 Setting limits using expert judgment 
 
Setting alarm limits using statistics is very common. Statistical data shows the degradation 
condition using mean values and standard deviation for each parameter. The base line value would 
then be the set as the mean value, where the limits will be put at certain standard deviations. A 
mean value will be set for each parameter, and the limits are set with respect to degradation rate or 
PoF. An example is shown in Figure 3.28. 
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Figure 3.28 Setting limits using statistics 
 
Setting alarms using trending is done by looking at the rate-of-change. Events often follow a certain 
pattern or trend (e.g. rate of corrosion, erosion, etc.), and this alarm is triggered if there is any rate-
of-change. This type of alarm normally requires human interpretation where the analyst looks for a 
bend or a knee (ref. Figure 3.29), but it can also be done automatically by using something similar to 
the compression test; see Figure 3.11. This can be thought of as the use of trending with a set 
degradation rate, where a variance acceptance limit (as in Figure 3.28) is set to follow the preset 
degradation rate. Figure 3.29 shows an example of the use of trending in a qualitative way. 
  
 
Figure 3.29 Alarm limits set using trending 
 
The last method of setting alarms is the use of models. Models, in this case, should be used when 
considering more complex degradation mechanisms. Such mechanisms often include several 
parameters which should then be correlated to make a model, showing how they affect degradation 
of the condition. The model should then show how the parameters together affect degradation, and 
limits will then be set with respect to the correlating degradation, as shown in Figure 3.30 (ref. 
Figure 3.18).  
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Figure 3.30 Setting degradation limits using a model based approach (Adapted from DNV 
presentation 2, 2008) 
 
3.7.b Further processing 
Tags with critical degradation conditions should be risk-estimated, but smaller changes could also 
alter the original risk. Thus, there should be a limit for how much change is allowed. 
 
All the data is processed, and the results are given in PoF or degradation rate, for the two respective 
degradation models. These results should then be put up against a limit for when it should be 
further processed. These limits should be set with respect to the original value. The original RBI 
analysis is done using calculations based on set parameter values given by the offshore operator. 
But these values might change, thus changing the calculations for degradation condition, and 
ultimately the risk. Setting a limit for how much the condition can change should therefore be done. 
 
All methods stated earlier can be used to set a limit, but some suit certain degradation models better 
than others. The statistical method will be used for many of the degradation mechanisms in the 
susceptibility model since these mostly depend on temperature. The rate model often depends on 
several parameters, so the model method should be preferred. Trending can also be used for the 
rate model where the limit is set to a certain degradation rate, and if this rate changes over a certain 
limit the data should be further processed.  
 
In addition, changes do not necessarily have to be negative with respect to degradation. If the 
temperature becomes lower over time it will also alter the original risk. Thus, there has to be a limit 
“both ways”, as shown in Figure 3.28, by using variance (e.g. ± 5 % change, etc.).  
 
3.7.c Inspection reminder 
An inspection reminder is triggered if a planned inspection is overdue. This will thus be triggered 
from the inspection plan (ref. Chapter 3.8) if inspections are not done in time. Such alarms might 
also be triggered when the OE updates the inspection plan with the new PoF. Some inspections then 
become overdue because of the change in risk; thus, also the change in the next time-to-inspect. 
 
3.7.d Inspection alarm 
The inspection alarm is there to notify the OE that the condition is at a critical level, and an 
inspection should be carried out immediately to ensure that production can continue. The alarm is 
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triggered if the PoF is above the pre-defined acceptance criterion. This acceptance criterion is set by 
finding the lowest PoF which still results in safe operation.  Standards, governmental requirements, 
as well as the offshore operator’s and the OE’s own requirements are used for setting an 
appropriate acceptance limit.  
 
Since the system is set up in the way that it might not be continuously monitored, notifications 
should be sent to the OE if an inspection alarm is triggered. Since the local server will continuously 
process data and perform risk estimation (if parameters have changed), the alarm will be triggered 
at the right time. Ways of notifying the client can be through e-mail, sms, or simple pop-ups on the 
client’s screen, triggered by the local server. These notifications should be made in a way that 
ensures that it gets the OE’s attention. 
 
3.7.e Changing limits and operation conditions 
As mentioned earlier, the GUI system should be flexible in the way that the OE can easily change 
limits and operational conditions if necessary. Using the gathered information to change the system 
will be further discussed in the chapter concerning decision support.   
 
3.8 Inspection planning and execution 
 
This chapter will discuss how inspection plans should be updated, and how the inspections should 
be executed based on updates and alarms. In addition, it will show how the OE should perform a 
quality check of the results and verify that the calculated condition is correct. The chapter is based 
on DNV’s recommended practice (DNV, 2009). 
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Figure 3.31 Inspection planning and execution 
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3.8.a Quality check of data and results 
This section presents how to quality check data and ensure monitoring effectiveness. This part is 
based on a section of a report made by RIMAP on inspection and monitoring effectiveness (RIMAP, 
2003). 
 
Data could include errors which means that it should be checked to ensure that the results are 
correct. Inspections done manually (NDT) are performed by using the best technique for finding the 
required information; thus, the results will be the “correct” values. However, when we think of the 
continuous monitoring and processing of parameters, there could be errors in the data. Examples: 
 Faulty sensors  
 Corruption of signal (noise) 
 Error in calculation 
 Missing data 
 etc. 
 
When the OE gets updates of changes to the original risk, it is important to ensure that the results 
are correct. Firstly, the OE should find out which parameter causes the change in risk, and thereby 
determine if the results are true. Such a quality check is important to ensure that no faulty data is 
included in the inspection plan, and it should be done qualitatively by the OE. 
 
One way of assuring correct results is by using the inspection results to see if the calculated 
degradation relates to the inspected degradation. This is done by comparing the calculated 
degradation with the inspected results, and assuring that it is higher or equal. If this is not true there 
could be an error in the calculation (in the equation itself or in missing data) or the sensor (faulty 
sensor or corruption of signal). Equation 1 shows the effectiveness of the monitoring process should 
be equal or above one, where Dreal is the actual value (e.g. wall thickness, degradation, etc.), while 
DMonitor is the measured value (RIMAP, 2003). Equation 2 shows that inspection results should be 
less or equal to the monitored value, this would also work as a safety buffer since it would be a 
conservative value (better to be safe than sorry) (RIMAP, 2003). 
 
 
(1) 
 (2) 
 
Repeatability is another way for the OE to quality check data, and it is very effective when 
considering a continuous flow of new data.  By looking at the data over a long period and finding the 
repeatability (e.g. pattern), a fluctuation that does not make sense can easily be discovered. This 
could then mean that a sensor is faulty, there is corruption of the signal or lack of data.  
 
A full quality check of the system should also be done at certain time intervals to ensure that the 
calculated results are correct. Since the condition management system will be automatic until the 
update of the inspection plan, the actual results might be worse, or better, than the calculated 
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results show. For example, if the nominal wall thickness was not updated with the new inspection 
results, this could cause the PoF to be higher or lower than it was supposed to be. Such mistakes are 
important since they could cause equipment to be overlooked. Thus, the OE should look into each 
corrosion group at a time and look for errors in the system as well. 
 
3.8.b Inspection planning 
The inspection plan made for an offshore platform will be based on the risk estimation, and since 
the risk changes with respect to parameters, the inspection plan will change as well. The condition 
management system is created to make the inspection planning as accurate as possible, and to 
ensure that inspections are done at the right time, and in a correct manner. Using the collected 
information from the previous steps (e.g. data, calculations, inspection results, etc.) as well as 
his/her own knowledge, the OE should be able to plan inspections so they are executed at the right 
time, and in the right way. 
 
 
Figure 3.32 Higher risk = Higher inspection frequency 
 
Originally, inspection plans were updated at a certain interval (e.g. every one to three years), based 
only on inspection results and engineering judgement. With the condition management system, the 
inspection plan will be updated when there are changes to the original risk. The OE will be notified 
of changes in risk, see Figure 3.20, and will then qualitatively assess each of these. Firstly, a quality 
check is performed to verify that the results are true, before the OE uses the new results to see how 
much this will alter the original inspection plan. 
 
The inspection should be updated qualitatively since it does not only include when to inspect, but 
also where to inspect, what technique to use, what to look for, and what to report (ref. Chapter 2.2). 
Updates to the inspection plan will be based on processed data, but also a qualitative assessment of 
pictures/videos from inspections as well as knowledge based on experience and historical data. 
Thus, the inspection plan should be assessed and updated qualitatively by the OE. 
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When to inspect is set by finding how much time it will take before the PoF reaches the acceptance 
limit. For the rate model, this can be calculated based on wall thickness (t0), confidence in results 
(a), mean damage rate (dmean) and limit for wall thickness (trelease)  (DNV, 2009): 
 
 (3) 
 
However, for the susceptibility model, it must be set qualitatively with respect to the parameter 
which affects degradation in addition to the confidence of the results given (DNV, 2009).  
 
Since the OE will get information about which degradation mechanisms are initiated, it is easier to 
find out where, how, and what to look for. For example, if erosion has occurred, the inspection 
should be done where the flow changes direction (e.g. choke valves, turning pipes, etc.) since 
erosion tends to appear at such “worst case” spots. The techniques that can be used are ultrasonic 
testing or radiographic testing since these are adequate for measuring wall thickness. What to 
report will again be based on the degradation mechanism, and in this case wall thickness should be 
reported. For more information regarding inspection planning, see DNV’s recommended practice 
(DNV, 2009). 
 
All changes in risk must be qualitatively assessed before the inspection plan is updated. Even if 
there is an inspection alarm, a qualitative assessment of the situation should be done, including a 
quality check. The only difference with an inspection alarm is that it is notified directly to the OE 
from the risk estimation, and the inspection should be planned and executed as soon as possible 
since the PoF is close to unsafe operation. 
 
The inspection plan for the complete installation should also be updated at the original interval (e.g. 
every two to four years). This update will go through each corrosion group and update the 
inspection plan based on the collected and processed information (e.g. process data, inspection data, 
sampled data, design changes, etc.) since the last interval.  
 
3.8.c Inspection Execution 
Inspections are executed using the most appropriate methods available. DNV’s recommended 
practice lists the most common inspection methods: visual inspection, thermography, radiographic 
testing, eddy current, etc. The method used is based on the degradation mechanism, whether it is 
internal or external, and what the inspector is looking for (e.g. corrosion, erosion, etc.) (DNV, 2009). 
 
Inspections will be executed based on the inspection plan, but there are three levels of inspection 
priority: inspection alarm, inspection reminder and planned inspections. Inspection alarms are of 
course most critical, while the reminders should be always be done before the original planned 
inspections.  
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Figure 3.33 Inspections executed based on criticality  
 
Inspection alarms have the highest priority since the risk estimation showed that the risk was above 
the acceptance criteria. Inspections that are based on such alarms are executed to ensure that it is 
safe to continue operation, and that the estimated risks were true. 
 
Firstly, the inspector should inspect the respective equipment and find out whether the conditions 
stated in the analysis are true. The results from these inspections would then either support the 
results, or reject them. Secondly, if the results show that the conditions are not true, measures have 
to be taken to find out why the results were wrong. However, if they are true, decisions have to be 
made about what to do next (e.g. shut down production, modify equipment, change process 
conditions, etc.) (ref. Chapter 3.9). 
 
Inspections based on reminders will be performed before planned inspections since they are 
overdue, and thus have a higher priority since the risk is higher. These inspections are carried out to 
ensure that conditions are at a satisfactory level and to update the risk estimation among other 
calculations (e.g. degradation rate, etc.) with actual, and correct, information (e.g. actual wall 
thickness, actual corrosion, etc.). Inspection results will also be included in the quality check of the 
process data where inspection data is used to evaluate the calculations made (ref. Chapter 3.8a). 
 
The inspection report is sent from the inspector to the OE, who then uploads this on the local server. 
The OE would then manually include the data (e.g. wall thickness) into the appropriate models and 
calculations (ref. Chapter 3.5). Inspection results should be marked with an ID tag, thereby 
simplifying the job of including results in the correct corrosion group. The full inspection report will 
also include pictures, sometimes video as well, from the inspection, giving the OE better decision 
support. 
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3.9 Decision support 
 
Decision support is where information and data from the previous steps are used to aid the OEs of 
the system in taking proper decisions regarding inspection planning and other enquiries. The OE 
has two main sources as support in the decision-making process: knowledge and information. 
Knowledge is what the OE has gained through experience in such field of work, while information is 
what the condition management is supposed to give. 
 
 
Figure 3.34 Decision support 
 
Figure 3.34 is a simplified model showing how decision support is used in the condition 
management system. The OE is able to gather information from anywhere in the system as support 
in decisions that have to be made. This system is designed to make the inspection plan dynamic (ref. 
Chapter 3.8), and ensure that inspections are carried out at the right time. However, the OE can also 
use the gathered information to support other decisions, including future design, modifications or 
changes within the system itself.   
 
Design and modifications that are going to be performed on the installation can use historical data 
from this system, giving the designers information on how to avoid high degradation. The OE will 
also continuously evaluate the system itself to make it more effective and accurate, for example 
including more ID tags, changing limits, changing process conditions, changing degradation 
calculations, including degradation mechanisms, etc. Limits regarding further processing and the 
time period for averaging of parameters should be assessed at intervals to make the system as 
accurate as possible.  
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Support is also important regarding another part that the OE has to decide on: the inspection alarm. 
When the OE is notified of such an alarm, an inspection is planned and executed as soon as possible. 
The results from this inspection, together with other information (calculations, trends, etc.), will 
give the OE a better ground to base a decision on, regarding shutting down (very high risk), 
performing modifications (measures to lower PoF), or continuing production (results better than 
expected). 
 
However, the OE of the condition management system is not the only one that will benefit from this 
support system. The inspector executes inspections based on inspection plans given by the OE 
onshore. However, the inspector should also have the possibility of utilizing the system to make the 
inspection as accurate as possible. The inspection plan would include everything concerning where, 
how and when, but no information regarding last inspection results. The results from the last 
inspection would give the inspector a simple quality check of his/her own results, since the wall has 
to be thinner than (or equal to) last time. Estimations (degradation calculations) will in addition 
give the inspector an indication of what the results (e.g. wall thickness, corrosion) are supposed to 
be. However, estimations should not be followed blindly since inspection results are used as a 
quality check for these estimations (ref. Chapter 3.8). 
 
3.10 The condition management system 
 
The previous chapters presented the different processes in the condition management system, and 
gave guidance as to how each of them should be solved. This chapter will explain Figure 3.2 and 
show how the system can be divided into three main parts: setup, condition monitoring and risk-
based inspection.  
 
 
Figure 3.35 The three main parts of the condition management system (Ref. Figure 3.2) 
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Setup is the part where all the ground work for setting up such a system is done. This part ranges 
from finding damage mechanisms to how to connect the sensor to the computer. When this part is 
done, it would not need to be updated very often. However, changes in design, process conditions or 
other modifications would require changes in what sensors/sampling stations use. This is already 
thought of since the system is so flexible that a simple search for the correct sensor ID tag would 
download wanted information immediately. 
 
Condition monitoring focuses on continuous collection and processing of data. This part is what 
makes the condition management system dynamic by always keeping the OE up-to-date on changes 
in the process. Since degradation is slow, averaging filters are included to avoid that the OE is 
updated on all changes (e.g. spikes in parameter data), and just the impending initiation of 
degradation. This ensures an efficient system where the OE can easily monitor degradation 
condition at all times. 
 
The risk-based inspection part focuses on the inspection planning and execution, and the OE is of 
course included. The OE gathers all accessible information and uses this as support regarding 
inspection planning, as well as in other decisions that have to be made (e.g. system design, 
modifications to installation, etc.). The OE would get indications (e.g. traffic light, risk changes, etc.) 
of bad degradation when monitoring the system, while notifications (e.g. inspection alarms) would 
arise if the risk estimation is above the acceptance criteria. This is the most automatic system that 
can be made since many of the decisions regarding inspection planning cannot be made 
quantitatively.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Discussion 
 
This thesis presents a system where the inspection planning is made dynamic through the use of 
live process data. The model is based on the framework, but some parts, like the risk estimation, 
have been made automatic. Besides that, the model from this thesis does not use the full loop as the 
framework does, but instead divides the system into two loops: condition monitoring and risk-
based inspection. The first loop is automatic and continuous, making it possible for the OE to get a 
live view of degradation conditions at all times, and also to be notified when it is not monitored 
qualitatively through inspection alarms. The second loop is also continuous since inspections are 
performed when planned, but the loop itself is updated by the OE. 
 
A challenge with this task was to make it as dynamic as possible, through making it fully automatic. 
This can be done through making limits/filters wherever a decision has to be made. However, after 
careful consideration, the result is that this will not work when it comes to inspection planning. The 
decisions that have to be made in this phase need a qualitative view which computers cannot give. 
In addition, a qualitative check of the data should be performed since there might be errors that the 
filters in data collection did not detect, and to ensure that the inspection plan updates are correct 
before being implemented.  
 
Other challenges with the proposed framework are to set the limits/filters for the decisions that are 
going to be automatic. This would be time-consuming work where each parameter has to be 
evaluated with respect to the degradation rate and model. Challenging limits/filters that have to be 
made are:  
 Filter for averaging parameter data 
 Limits for showing degradation condition (overview) 
 Limits for the data to be further processed (risk estimated) 
 
However, if these limits/filters are made through assessing each degradation mechanism in detail, 
an applicable limit can be determined. This would need expertise in the field (e.g. engineers within 
the fields of degradation, inspection, material, process, etc.) that would thoroughly assess each 
parameter of their respective degradation mechanism.  
 
The last discussion is regarding inspection results, and making it possible for the inspector to 
automatically include results (e.g. wall thickness, degradation, etc.) into the system, thus removing 
the manual input by the OE. However, since such inspection results can include pictures and videos, 
it is better that an expert in degradation assesses all information before including the new results. 
This would ensure that the results are quality checked and correct before they are included. In 
addition, inspections cannot always be executed at the exact hot-spot required (e.g. poor access), 
which would mean that the results might not be correct, and should therefore be assessed by the 
OE.
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis presents a study carried out to develop a procedure for how to integrate live process 
data to make the RBI analysis dynamic. The procedure intends to show how the live data can be 
collected and processed to effectively give the OE the live condition regarding degradation of the 
installation. It further shows how this information could be included in the planning of inspections, 
making the RBI analysis dynamic. 
 
The proposed model uses steps from an earlier framework as a fundament, and gives guidance to 
how each of the processes should be carried out to make the system as effective and accurate as 
possible. Considerations and challenges that arose in each step are discussed, and solved using a 
qualitative approach. The end result is both quantitative and qualitative (semi-Q), which was done 
to make the model as automatic as possible, without losing the accuracy of the end result. 
 
Live process data is continuously collected by a main server from sensors and sampling stations on 
the installation. Data required for assessing degradation condition is collected using unique ID tags, 
to avoid downloading data that are not necessary, while inspection results are received directly 
from the inspector. The data, including inspection results, are then processed with respect to the 
appropriate degradation model (Chapter 3.5). To present results efficiently, the processed data is 
compared to appropriate degradation limits and shown to the OE through GUI (graphic user 
interface) (Figure 3.20). Data with changes would automatically be risk-estimated, at which point 
considerable changes in risk would be notified to the OE through the GUI (changes to original risk) 
or e-mail (risk>acceptance criteria). The OE can then easily assess all changes in degradation and 
include the updated information into the inspection plan, making the RBI dynamic. In addition, the 
information available can also be used as decision support regarding design, modifications, 
calculations, etc. (Chapter 3.9).  
 
Making the condition management system so independent and automatic means that the OE would 
not have to monitor the degradation condition often. The OE will only use this system when there 
are considerable changes to the original risk or when new inspection results are received. However, 
the system would still be available for the OE at all times, and everything from a detailed view of 
each parameter to the degradation condition of the complete system can easily be accessed. Such 
flexibility enables the OE to find any information required to support decisions that have to be 
made. 
 
It is expected that the proposed model will be found applicable for installations that want a dynamic 
inspection programme based on risk. The model is based on existing technology as well as the use of 
existing sensors and sampling stations on the installation, which results in small modification and 
installation costs to create a dynamic and effective inspection programme. 
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APPENDIX A 
Determining PoF and CoF (DNV, 2009): 
 
Table 4-1 Probability of failure description 
Cat. 
Annual failure probability 
Description 
Quantitative Qualitative 
5 > 10-2 Failure expected 
(1) In a small population*, one or more failures can be expected 
annually. 
(2) Failure has occurred several times a year in location. 
4 10-3 to 10-2 High 
(1) In a large population**, one or more failures can be expected 
annually. 
(2) Failure has occurred several times a year in the operating 
company. 
3 10-4 to 10-3 Medium 
(1) Several failures may occur during the life of the installation for a 
system comprising a small number of components. 
(2) Failure has occurred in the operating company. 
2 10-5 to 10-4 Low 
(1) Several failures may occur during the life of the installation for a 
system comprising a large number of components. 
(2) Failure has occurred in industry. 
1 < 10-5 Negligible 
(1) Failure is not expected. 
(2) Failure has not occurred in industry. 
Notes: 
*   Small population = 20 to 50 components 
** Large population = More than 50 components 
 
 
Table 4-2 Consequence of failure qualitative ranking scales [ISO 2000] 
Rank CoF Personnel Safety CoF Environment CoF Economic 
A Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
B Slight/minor injury Slight/minor effect Slight/minor damage 
C Major injury Local effect Local damage 
D Single fatality Major effect Major damage 
E Multiple fatalities Massive fatalities Extensive damage 
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APPENDIX B 
Detailed risk matrix (DNV, 2009): 
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APPENDIX C 
High resolution P&ID (Adapted from document acquired from private communication, DNV): 
 
 
Pressure transmitter 
Temperature and flow 
transmitter 
Temperature and flow 
transmitter 
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